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Subjective performance evaluations, self-esteem, and
ego-threats in principal-agent relations
By Alexander Sebald and Markus Walzl∗
We conduct a laboratory experiment with agents working on and
principals beneﬁting from a real eﬀort task in which the agents’ ef-
fort/performance can only be evaluated subjectively. Principals give sub-
jective performance feedback to agents and agents have an opportunity
to sanction principals. We ﬁnd that agents sanction whenever the feed-
back of principals is below their subjective self-evaluations even if the
agents’ payoﬀ is independent of the principals’ feedback. Based on our
experimental analysis we propose a principal-agent model with subjective
performance evaluations that accommodates this ﬁnding. We analyze the
agents’ (optimal) behavior, optimal contracts, and social welfare in this
environment.
JEL:D01; D02; D82; D86; J41.
Keywords: Contracts, Subjective Performance Evaluations, Self-Esteem,
Ego-Threats.
Providing performance feedback and creating incentives through performance pay is
an integral part of numerous variants of social and economic interaction. For example,
teachers regularly grade the performance of their students and give feedback, employers
regularly evaluate the performance of their employees, give feedback and pay for perfor-
mance. To capture performance in a purely objective way is very often hard to accomplish
as a lot of valuable information about performance is captured by subjective impressions
rather than objective measures. For example, spelling out tenure or hiring criteria purely
on the basis of objective measures such as the number (and impact factor) of publications,
the amount of research funds, or the number of supervised PhD-students hardly allows
for an assessment of the applicant’s qualities as a teacher, his “good citizenship”, his
dedication to research collaborations, or his scientiﬁc potential – issues typically assessed
in the appraisal of a tenure committee or a letter of recommendation. In general, as it is
costly and diﬃcult to specify all (objective) contingencies in a contract, it is often pre-
ferred to leave (part of the) performance feedback to a more holistic subjective appraisal
by e.g. a supervisor or a tenure committee who typically not only aggregate objective
information but decide subjectively with considerable discretionary leeway.
Numerous contributions in economics have recognized the prevalence and importance of
subjective performance evaluations and corresponding performance pay in labor market
relations [see e.g. Gibbs et al. (2004), Ittner et al. (2003), Levine (2003), Milkovich and
Wigdor (1991), Murphy & Oyer (2003), and Prendergast (1999)]. It has been highlighted
that there is a trade-oﬀ between more holistic measures of performance [see Prendergast
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(1999)] and the potential for conﬂict due to subjective and, hence, possibly diverging
performance assessments by principals and agents [see McLeod(2003)]. Furthermore,
associated with the potential for conﬂict, a central insight in this literature is that em-
ployment relations based on subjective performance evaluations are particularly fragile in
one-shot interactions. If labor contracts specify payments on the basis of the principals’
subjective appraisals, principals have an incentive to claim that performance was poor in
order to establish low wages. As a consequence, ineﬃciently low eﬀort may be spend by
agents – unless principals can credibly commit to an honest revelation of their subjective
information as, for instance, in repeated interaction or with a credible payment to a third
party [see e.g. Levine (2003) or McLeod (2003)].
In contrast to this, we demonstrate in our analysis that the credibility of a truthful
revelation of the principals’ subjective performance signal can also be established in one-
shot interactions and without a third party as agents tend to create ‘costly conﬂicts’ for
principals if their own subjective performance appraisals are better than the principals’
feedback. That is, we ﬁrst experimentally show that agents are willing to forgo own pay-
oﬀ to create ‘costly conﬂicts’, if their own subjective performance appraisals are better
than the principals’ and second, formalize and analyze a simple principal-agent model
that incorporates our experimental ﬁndings.
Speciﬁcally, our laboratory experiment matches participants into pairs and randomly
assigns them to one of two roles, principal or agent. The agent has to work on a real
eﬀort task. The task is such that both agent and principal only get a subjective signal
about the agent’s performance. The principal beneﬁts from the eﬀort of the agent and
gives performance feedback. In reaction to the feedback, the agent has the opportunity to
reduce the principal’s payoﬀ at a cost for himself. In our experiment we ﬁnd that agents’
reactions to principals’ feedback strongly depend on their self-perceptions. Agents reduce
payoﬀs of principals, if the principals’ feedback is below their self-perception, but accept
the feedback and refuse to reduce payoﬀs if the feedback conﬁrms/is higher than their
own evaluation.
This pattern can be observed in an incentive treatment where the principal’s feedback
determines the agent’s payoﬀ and in a ﬂat treatment where the agent’s payoﬀ is con-
stant and thereby unaﬀected by the feedback. The willingness to reduce payoﬀs in the
incentive treatment can be explained by distributional concerns as e.g. inequity aversion
or reciprocity. As payoﬀs are according to the principal’s feedback, the agent may con-
sider a feedback below his own evaluation as a decision that generates an unequal payoﬀ
distribution, or as an unkind act by the principal whose willingness to pay falls short
of the agent’s expectations or what the agent feels entitled to. However, the results of
incentive and ﬂat treatment taken together rather suggest a motivation for payoﬀ re-
ductions that is not driven by the payoﬀ consequences of the principal’s feedback but by
the tension between subjective feedback and the agent’s self-evaluation as such. The fact
that individuals dislike a tension between feedback and self-perception, and regard it as a
threat to their self-esteem, i.e. an ego-threat, that triggers aggressive behavior or conﬂict
as a protection mechanism is a central ﬁnding in social psychology. As shown e.g. by
Greenwald (1980), Bushman & Baumeister (1998) and Baumeister (2005)], people seem
to care about their self-esteem and try to enhance, maintain and protect it.
Based on our experimental ﬁndings and the corresponding insights from social psy-
chology, we present a simple principal-agent model that captures the agent’s eagerness to
protect his self-esteem against ego-threats. Within this model we analyze the dependence
of the agent’s (optimal) behavior, optimal contracts, and social welfare on the agent’s
sensitivity towards ego-threats, the nature of conﬂict created by the agent, and the qual-
ity of subjective performance evaluations. We demonstrate that an increase in the level of
conﬂict that the agent can impose on the principal or the sensitivity of the agent towards
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ego-threats enhances welfare if the eﬀort of the agent is suﬃciently valuable (i.e., if the
agent works on a valuable project) even if conﬂict and the dis-utility from ego-threats are
costly from a welfare point of view. The reason is that an enhanced level of conﬂict or
sensitivity increases the maximum eﬀort that can be implemented by the principal which
is a binding constraint for valuable projects. Hence, in particular for these projects,
high levels of potential conﬂict and a high sensitivity of employees towards ego-threats
should be appreciated by employers as they facilitate a credible commitment towards a
truthful revelation of the principals’ performance signals and thereby help establishing
incentives to induce high eﬀort levels. Therefore, employers facing the problem of subjec-
tive performance evaluations in their relation to employees should not per-se try to select
a work-force with a low sensitivity towards ego-threats or without independent judgment,
or try to eliminate opportunities of conﬂict creation.
In recent years also economists have started to acknowledge the importance of self-
esteem in decision making and strategic interactions [e.g. Elling- sen & Johannesson
(2008), Compte & Postlewaite (2004), Be´nabou & Tirole (2002), Ko¨szegi (2006)]. It is
argued that people strive for positive self-perceptions because they entail a consumption
and motivational value. For example, Ko¨szegi (2006) endows individuals with ego-utility
and demonstrates its eﬀect on choices between more or less ambitious tasks. In particular,
this model explains the phenomenon of overconﬁdence by individuals who update believes
according to Bayes’ rule. Be´nabou & Tirole (2002), Compte & Postlewaite (2004), and
Ellingsen & Johannesson (2008) on the other hand, center on the motivational value of
self-conﬁdence. It is argued that conﬁdence in one’s ability and eﬃcacy or a psychological
payoﬀ from being esteemed by others can help individuals to undertake more ambitious
tasks. When people have imperfect knowledge about their own ability and/or when eﬀort
and ability are complements, then more self-conﬁdence enhances peoples’ motivation to
act [Be´nabou & Tirole (2002): 873].
As said before, however, psychologists have not only identiﬁed the implicit impact of
self-esteem on information processing and motivation, but also stress people’s eagerness
to actively maintain and protect positive self-perceptions. First, people protect their
self-esteem by systematically taking credit for success and denying blame for failure and
second, people have a tendency to uncritically accept positive feedback and eagerly search
for ﬂaws/faults in other’s criticism [e.g. Baumeister (2005), Greenwald (1980)]. Third
and most importantly for our investigation, psychologists have found that conﬂicts and
aggression tend to result from positive self-images that are challenged or threatened [e.g.
Baird (1977), Raskin et al (1991), Bushman & Baumeister (1998)]. It is argued that
hostile aggression is an expression of the self’s rejection of ego-threatening evaluations
received from other people [e.g. Baumeister et al (1996)]. People with high self-esteem
usually hold conﬁdent and highly favorable ideas about themselves, i.e. they exhibit
ego-involvement, and react belligerently to ego-threatening feedback from others [Baird
(1977), Shrauger & Lund (1975) and Korman (1969)]. Our contribution demonstrates
the signiﬁcance of these eﬀects in an incentivized laboratory experiment and proposes a
simple model that formalizes these ﬁndings.
In the following section we present the set-up of our experiment. In section II, we
discuss our experimental ﬁndings regarding conﬂict creation. In section III, we present a
principal-agent model with subjective performance evaluations that includes preferences
for conﬂict creation in-line with our experimental ﬁndings. Section IV concludes with
some remarks on the practical implications of our analysis.
I. Experimental Set-up
In this experiment we investigate individual reactions to performance feedback in envi-
ronments in which people only have subjective performance information. The experiment
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took place in June and November 2009 in the laboratory of the Center for Experimental
Economics at the University of Copenhagen with in total 186 participants who completed
the experiment.1 We conducted two treatments, incentive and ﬂat, each consisting of four
experimental sessions. On average participants took 45 minutes to complete the experi-
ment and received about 110 DKK (∼ 15 Euros).
At the beginning of the experiment, all participants were randomly assigned to a group
and one of two diﬀerent roles labeled Person A and Person B. Each group consisted of
one Person A and one Person B. Participants were provided with experimental instruc-
tions (see Appendix C). After reading the instructions, participants took actions at four
diﬀerent stages: i) control questions, ii) clicking-task, iii) evaluation and feedback and
iv) reaction.
In stage i) (control questions), all participants had to answer a set of control questions
before being able to proceed (for the corresponding screen-shots see Appendix D).
In stage ii) (clicking-task), participants in the role of Person B had to work on a real-
eﬀort task (i.e. they acted as ‘agents’). The real-eﬀort task consisted of clicking away
boxes on a computer screen (for a screen-shot of the clicking task see Appendix D). For
a period of x seconds, 20 screens with boxes appeared for various time intervals (i.e.
between 3 and 9 seconds). At the end of each time interval the screen disappeared with
the remaining (i.e. un-clicked) boxes and a new screen with a new set of boxes popped
up. In order to create heterogeneity in B-Persons’ self evaluations, we had one session in
which x = 120, two sessions in which x = 90 and one session in which x = 50 in each
treatment.2 Person A saw the same screen as Person B and could observe him clicking
away the boxes (i.e., Person A acted as a ‘principal’).
In both treatments, Person A’s payoﬀ was determined by the percentage of boxes
clicked away by Person B during the clicking-task.3 If
• Person B clicked away 0-20% of the boxes: Person A received 200 points.
• Person B clicked away 20-40% of the boxes: Person A received 300 points.
• Person B clicked away 40-60% of the boxes: Person A received 400 points.
• Person B clicked away 60-80% of the boxes: Person A received 500 points.
• Person B clicked away 80-100% of the boxes: Person A received 600 points.
At stage iii) (evaluation and feedback), both participants were asked to evaluate B’s
performance by telling the percentage of boxes that B clicked away (i.e., both partici-
pants had to state one of the ﬁve categories 0-20%, 20-40%, 40-60%, 60-80%, 80-100%).
Furthermore, Person A was asked to give feedback to Person B with the same categories.
In the incentive treatment, Person B’s payoﬀ depended on Person A’s feedback as follows:
• Person A’s feedback 0-20%: Person B received 100 points from A.
• Person A’s feedback 20-40%: Person B received 150 points from A.
• Person A’s feedback 40-60%: Person B received 200 points from A.
• Person A’s feedback 60-80%: Person B received 250 points from A.
• Person A’s feedback 80-100%: Person B received 300 points from A.
1In total 190 persons participated but 4 participants (2 groups) did not complete the experiment due
to a technical problem. The analysis is based on the 186 individuals that completed the experiment.
2Note that the 20 screens were the same in all sessions. We only varied the number of seconds that
the screen was shown.
3In the instructions (see Appendix C), we informed participants about the payoﬀ scheme. Payoﬀs
in the experiment were expressed in points and participants were informed at the beginning of the ex-
periment that points were exchanged into Danish crowns at the end of the experiment at an exchange
rate of 10 points = 3.5 DKK. For a summary statistic concerning the number of participants per treat-
ment/session, number of appeared boxes/average number of boxes clicked away etc see Appendix E.
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In the ﬂat treatment, on the other hand, Person B’s payoﬀ was 200 points independent
of Person A’s feedback.
At stage iv) (reaction), Person B was able to react to Person A’s feedback with a
reduction of Person A’s payoﬀ by up to 100 points. To elicit reaction behavior, we used
the strategy method: while Person A was giving feedback, we asked Person B to indicate
for each possible feedback that he could receive by how much he would like to reduce
Person A’s payoﬀ. Hence, for each possible feedback level (0-20%, 20-40%, 40-60%, 60-
80%, 80-100%) Person B had to state between 0 and 100 points by which he wanted to
reduce Person A’s payoﬀ in case this was Person A’s actually stated feedback. For every
point that Person B reduced Person A’s payoﬀ, Person B had to pay 0.25 points.
After stage iv) and a small questionnaire, Person B’s real performance, Person A’s
feedback and Person B’s reaction to Person A’s actual feedback was used to calculate
payoﬀs. Finally, participants were shown the actual performance of Person B, Person A’s
feedback, Person B’s reaction and the actual payoﬀs on their screen. Note that at the
evaluation and feedback as well as the reaction stage, Person A and B decided on the
basis of their subjective perception of Person B’s performance. Only in the end of the
experiment when payoﬀs were listed, participants learned about B’s actual performance.
II. Conflict Creation
A. Experimental Observations
Using the strategy method, we elicited the self-perception (‘own evaluation’) of each
B-Person and the number of points that he wanted to reduce Person A’s payoﬀ (‘payoﬀ
reduction’), if Person A’s feedback was 0-20%, 20-40%, 40-60%, 60-80% and 80-100%.
Table 1 and 2 display the median payoﬀ reduction in the incentive and the ﬂat treatment,
respectively.
[Tables 1 and 2 here]
Tables 1 and 2 indicate that in both treatments the median payoﬀ reduction at feed-
back levels below own evaluation is positive. Furthermore, for the incentive treatment,
the median payoﬀ reduction increases in the gap between feedback and own evaluation
of B-Persons. In contrast to this, at feedback levels equal and above own evaluations the
median payoﬀ reduction is 0 in both treatments (with two exceptions: the payoﬀ reduc-
tion of people with own evaluation 40-60 and 60-80 at feedback levels 40-60 and 60-80,
respectively, in the incentive treatment). Hence, the median B-Persons in our experi-
ment reduce Person A’s payoﬀ if they receive a feedback from Person A that falls short of
their own evaluation but typically refuse to reduce Person A’s payoﬀ after feedback that
conﬁrms / is above their own evaluation – regardless of whether the payoﬀ that Person
B receives is dependent or independent of the feedback that Person A gives.
B. Testable Hypotheses
As a payoﬀ reduction is costly for Person B and the interaction between Person A and
B is one-shot, assuming selﬁshness and rationality would certainly yield the prediction
of no payoﬀ reduction in both treatments. We will refer to this case as Hypothesis 0.
The above-mentioned occurrence of payoﬀ reductions, however, suggests that individuals
acting as Person B sense a non-monetary motivation to reduce payoﬀs.
The economic literature emphasizes payoﬀ-related motives for costly payoﬀ reductions
such as distributional concerns [e.g., inequity aversion as in Fehr & Schmidt (1999) or
Bolton & Ockenfels (2000)], and reciprocity [as in Rabin (1993), Dufwenberg & Kirch-
steiger (2004), or Falk & Fischbacher (2006)]. In models of reciprocity, there exist an
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Table 1—: Median payoﬀ reduction: incentive treatment
Feedback Own Evaluation
0-20 20-40 40-60 60-80 80-100
0-20 ... 20 50 80 100
20-40 ... 0 30 50 80
40-60 ... 0 10 27.5 60
60-80 ... 0 0 12 10
80-100 ... 0 0 0 0
Total No: 0 14 15 12 1 Sum: 42
Table 2—: Median payoﬀ reduction: flat treatment
Feedback Own Evaluation
0-20 20-40 40-60 60-80 80-100
0-20 0 30 25 20 80
20-40 0 0 10 10 60
40-60 0 0 0 10 40
60-80 0 0 0 0 1
80-100 0 0 0 0 0
Total No: 6 7 22 13 3 Sum: 51
In Tables 1 and 2 each row (beside the last) and column correspond to a feedback level and a level of
own evaluation, respectively. The last row indicates the number of B-Persons’ that have levels of own-
evaluation 0-20%, 20-40%, 40-60% etc. For example, there are 14 B-Persons with an own evaluation of
20-40% in the incentive treatment. In total we have 42 B-Persons in the incentive and 51 B-Persons in
the flat treatment (the asymmetry is induced by non-show ups). Each row indicates the median payoﬀ
reduction B-Persons with a certain own-evaluation choose at this speciﬁc feedback level. For example,
the median payoﬀ reduction of B-Persons with an own evaluation of 20-40 at a feedback level of 0-20 and
20-40 in the incentive treatment is respectively 20 and 0 points.
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(endogenous) reference point against which people judge the kindness of their own as well
as other people’s actions. In our setting, Person B’s own evaluation and the resulting
expectation concerning what he is ‘entitled to’ may serve as such a reference point. If
Person B takes his own evaluation as a reference point for the compensation he feels enti-
tled to, he might feel unkindly treated by Person A, if his payoﬀ is less than according to
his own evaluation [for a discussion of reference dependent preferences see e.g. Ko¨szegi
& Rabin (2006) and Abeler et al. (2009)].
For the incentive treatment, Person A’s feedback determines the payoﬀ for Person B
(and may contain information about Person B’s performance) while Person B’s own eval-
uation is a subjective signal about his performance (and thereby also Person A’s actual
payoﬀ). For the following derivation of the hypotheses, we assume that Person B consid-
ers his own signal at least as informative as Person A’s feedback. For a given feedback
level, the payoﬀ distribution is therefore expected to be equal in the incentive treatment
if Person B’s own evaluation is equal to the feedback and expected to be unequal in favor
of Person A if the feedback is below Person B’s own evaluation. If payoﬀ reductions are
motivated by inequity aversion or (negative) reciprocity, we thus expect (weakly) larger
payoﬀ reductions if the feedback is below Person B’s own evaluation than if feedback
and own evaluation coincide. As a feedback above Person B’s own evaluation yields an
expected payoﬀ distribution in favor of Person B, inequity aversion would not predict
any payoﬀ reduction in this case (recall that one unit of reduced payoﬀ for Person A
only costs 1/4 unit for Person B). Similarly, reciprocity would not predict larger payoﬀ
reductions than for a coincidence of feedback and own evaluations.4 We summarize as
follows:
HYPOTHESIS 1: In the incentive treatment, for a given feedback, payoﬀ reductions are
smaller if the feedback is above/equal rather than below Person B’s own evaluation.
In the ﬂat treatment, Person B’s payoﬀ is independent of Person A’s feedback. Hence,
Person A’s feedback can neither be regarded as a kind nor an unkind act regarding
monetary outcomes. Therefore, reciprocity would not predict any payoﬀ reductions.
HYPOTHESIS 2: In the ﬂat treatment, no payoﬀ reduction is observed.
In contrast, if Person B is inequity averse, he may well have an incentive to reduce
payoﬀs. For a given own evaluation of Person B, however, these incentives are either in-
dependent of Person A’s feedback (if the feedback is considered as uninformative regarding
the actual payoﬀ distribution) or increasing in Person A’s feedback (if the feedback is
considered as informative regarding the actual payoﬀ distribution and higher feedback
levels imply higher expected payoﬀ for Person A).
HYPOTHESIS 3: In the ﬂat treatment, for a given evaluation of Person B, payoﬀ re-
ductions are (weakly) larger if the feedback is above/equal rather than below Person B’s
own evaluation.
In contrast to the above-mentioned payoﬀ related motives and as discussed in the
introduction, the psychological literature rather emphasizes the tension between Person
4Note that reciprocity could certainly explain payoﬀ reductions if the feedback level is above Person
B’s own evaluation. For example, consider an individual that regards any payoﬀ kept by Person A as
unkind or feels entitled to the entire payoﬀ generated by his eﬀort. Such an individual would also have
incentives to reduce payoﬀs if the feedback is above his own evaluation but still leaves some (expected)
payoﬀ to Person A. As we do not observe this kind of payoﬀ reductions, we drop this case from our
analysis.
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B’s own evaluations and Person A’s feedback as such. If Person B regards a feedback
below his own evaluation as a harmful ego-threat, while no ego-threat is perceived if
feedback and self-evaluation coincide or the former exceeds the latter, and if Person
B prefers to initiate costly conﬂict as ego-protection, then psychological costs (and the
motivation to reduce payoﬀs) are larger if the feedback is below Person B’s own evaluation
rather than equal of above in both treatments. This resembles Hypothesis 1 for the
incentive treatment but yields new hypothesis for the ﬂat treatment.5
HYPOTHESIS 4: In the ﬂat treatment, for a given evaluation of Person B, payoﬀ re-
ductions are smaller if the feedback is above/equal rather than below Person B’s own
evaluation.
To summarize, (costly) payoﬀ reductions cannot be explained on the basis of ratio-
nal, selﬁsh behavior. However, several assumptions on complex preferences oﬀer an
explanation for payoﬀ reductions. While all of these assumptions coincide regarding
the hypothesis for the incentive treatment, diﬀerent predictions are formed for the ﬂat
treatment. In particular, models of inequity aversion and reciprocity predict either no
or a positive impact of feedback on payoﬀ reductions in the ﬂat treatment, while the
protection against ego-threats suggests a negative relation (i.e., lower feedback – for a
given self-evaluation – increases payoﬀ reduction). In the next section, we will test the
corresponding hypotheses.
C. Data Analysis
For the tests, we consider each feedback level separately and ask whether the behavior
of B-Persons for whom this feedback level lies Below their own-evaluation signiﬁcantly
diﬀers from B-Persons for whom this feedback level is Equal/Above their own evaluation.
[Tables 3 and 4 here]
Table 3—: Median payoﬀ reduction per feedback level: incentive treatment
Feedback Feedback vs. Own Evaluation WMW-Test
Equal/Above Below Diﬀ P-Value
0-20 - (0) 50 (42) - -
20-40 0 (14) 35 (28) 35 (0.001)
40-60 0 (29) 40 (13) 40 (0.043)
60-80 0 (41) 10 (1) 10 (0.439)
80-100 0 (42) - (0) - -
Looking ﬁrst at the results of the incentive treatment (see Table 3) shows that for
feedback levels below 80-100 the median payoﬀ reduction of B-Persons for whom the
feedback level is below (i.e. Below) their own evaluation is higher than the median
payoﬀ reduction of B-Persons for whom the feedback level is conﬁrming or above (i.e.
Equal/Above) their own evaluation. Note that, as in the incentive treatment there is no
5Note that the protection against ego-threats can also be interpreted as a reciprocal mechanism. The
diﬀerence to the aforementioned form of reciprocity, however, is that perceived unkindness and related
psychological cost do not depend on the payoﬀ consequence of the feedback, but rather on the tension
between own evaluation and feedback as such.
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Table 4—: Median payoﬀ reduction per feedback level: flat treatment
Feedback Feedback vs. Own Evaluation WMW-Test
Equal/Above Below Diﬀ P-Value
0-20 0 (6) 30 (45) 30 (0.053)
20-40 0 (13) 10 (38) 10 (0.055)
40-60 0 (35) 15 (16) 15 (0.019)
60-80 0 (48) 1 (3) 1 (0.2415)
80-100 0 (51) - (0) - -
In Tables 3 and 4 we report for each feedback level the median payoﬀ reduction of B-Persons for whom
this feedback level is Equal/Above their own evaluation and for whom this feedback level is Below their
own evaluation. The corresponding number of observations is given in brackets. Furthermore we report
the results of the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney (WMW) test which analyzes whether the diﬀerence between
Equal/Above and Below is signiﬁcant.
B-Person with an own evaluation 0-20 we cannot report a median payoﬀ reduction for
the group Equal/Above at feedback level 0-20. Furthermore, as by design there are no
own evaluations above 80-100 we also cannot report a median payoﬀ reduction for the
group Below at feedback level 80-100. As shown in Table 3, the diﬀerences in payoﬀ
reductions are signiﬁcant up to the feedback level 60-80 for which the diﬀerence of the
medians is still positive (10 points) but the result of the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test
shows an insigniﬁcant diﬀerence between Equal/Above and Below.
RESULT 1: In the incentive treatment, for a given feedback level, (i) the median Person
B reduces payoﬀs of Person A if feedback is below their own evaluation, but (ii) does not
reduce payoﬀs if feedback is conﬁrming or above own evaluation. This rejects Hypotheses 0
and conﬁrms Hypotheses 1.
Hence, payoﬀ reductions at stage iv) in the incentive treatment are in-line with the
assumption of distributional concerns, reciprocity, and the protection against ego-threats.
To quite some extent, the results in the ﬂat treatment (see Table 4) resemble the
results from the incentive treatment. Using the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test in the ﬂat
treatment shows a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between these two groups at all feedback levels
up to 60-80. Hence, even if the payoﬀ of Person B is independent of Person A’s feedback,
payoﬀ reduction is signiﬁcantly higher in situations in which the feedback falls short of
the own evaluation compared to feedback that is conﬁrming or above Person B’s self
perception. Summarizing,
RESULT 2: In the ﬂat treatment, for a given feedback level, (i) the median Person B
reduces payoﬀs of Person A if feedback is below their own evaluation, but (ii) does not
reduce payoﬀs if feedback is conﬁrming or above own evaluation. This rejects Hypotheses 0
and 2.
Hence, behavior regarding payoﬀ reductions at stage iv) in the ﬂat treatment can
hardly be explained by reciprocity. To analyze the explanatory power of distributional
concerns and the protection against ego-threats with a test of Hypotheses 3 and 4, we
investigate the feedback dependence of payoﬀ reductions for a given self-evaluation by
Person B.
[Table 5 here]
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Table 5—: Median actual payoﬀ reduction per treatment
Feedback vs. Own Evaluation WMW-Test
Equal/Above Below P-Value
Incentive 0 (21) 40 (21) 0.0002
Flat 0 (45) 30.5 (6) 0.0320
Table 5 depicts the actual median payoﬀ reduction by B-Persons with feedback equal/above
and below own evaluation for the feedback given by Person A during the experiment.
As indicated in the second line (ﬂat treatment), median payoﬀ reduction is zero if the
feedback is above/equal to Person B’s own evaluation and 30.5 if the feedback is below
Person B’s own evaluation. As indicated by the corresponding Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney
test, median payoﬀ reduction are indeed signiﬁcantly diﬀerent for the two cases.
RESULT 3: In the ﬂat treatment, for a given self-evaluation, the median Person B
reduces the payoﬀ of Person A more if the feedback is below rather than above/equal the
self-evaluation. This rejects Hypothesis 3 and conﬁrms Hypothesis 4.
To summarize, taking together the results from the incentive and ﬂat treatment, our
data not only rejects the hypothesis that participants act as selﬁsh maximizers of individ-
ual proﬁt, but also demonstrates that models of distributional concerns and reciprocity
only explain our ﬁndings to a limited extent. In contrast to this, assuming that Person B
faces psychological costs of ego-threats (and psychological beneﬁts from a protection of
self-esteem) yields predictions regarding payoﬀ reductions that are in line with the results
of our experiment.
III. A principal agent model with subjective evaluation
In this section, we propose and analyze a simple principal agent model with subjective
performance evaluation to illustrate the economic implications of conﬂicts generated as
a protection against ego-threats. For the sake of comparability to the literature, we
now switch from our neutral experimental setting (with Person A and B) to the usual
terminology of principal and agent.
The model Assume there is a risk-neutral principal, P , who decides upon undertaking
a project which generates a value of φ > 0 if successful. The project requires eﬀort of an
agent, A. Assume that if the agent spends eﬀort p ∈ [0, 1], the project will be successful
(create value φ) with probability p. The project is a complex good or service and its
success is not veriﬁable, i.e. contracts contingent on the generation of φ are not feasible.
Neither principal nor agent can directly observe whether the project is successful or
not. Rather, both form an opinion about the agent’s performance during the production
process. I.e., they receive private signals about the agent’s performance. The principal
receives sP ∈ SP , where SP = {L,H}, i.e. the principal’s opinion can be such that
he regards the agent’s performance as either high (H) or low (L). Analogously, the
agent receives sA ∈ SA with SA = {L,H}. The signals sP and sA are non-veriﬁable
private pieces of information of the principal and the agent, respectively. The signals
are informative with respect to the success of the project. If the project is not successful
(which happens with probability (1−p)), principal and agent receive the signal sP = sA =
L. If the project is successful, the principal receives the signal sP = H with probability
g, the agent receives the same signal as the principal with probability ρ and receives
sA = H as an independent signal with probability x. Hence, g measures the quality of
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the principal’s signal, ρ indicates the correlation between the agent’s and the principal’s
signal - or the counter-probability of an independent judgment - and x quantiﬁes the
quality of the agent’s signal if he forms an independent judgment [our speciﬁcation of
the information technology coincides with Mcleod (2003), p.228, for expositional ease we
restrict ourselves to the case of a binary signal].
ASSUMPTION 1: (Information Technology) We assume that the principal’s and the
agent’s signal are imperfect, i.e., g ∈ (0, 1) and x ∈ (0, 1), and positively but imperfectly
correlated, i.e., ρ ∈ (0, 1).
We denote by γkl the conditional probability that sP = k and sA = l given that
the project is a success. Then, the ex-ante probability for the signal pair sP = L and
sA = H , for instance, will be pγLH = p(1 − g)(1 − ρ)x.6 Note that by Assumption 1,
γHHγLL > γHLγLH .
The timing of the game is as follows:
1) The principal oﬀers a contract to the agent and the agent decides upon acceptance.
Upfront payments are arranged.
2) The agent decides upon eﬀort p.
3) The project generates value φ with probability p.
4) The principal receives sP and the agent receives sA. The principal and the agent
report (not necessarily truth-fully) on sP and sA. Denote the reports by tP and
tA, respectively. tP and tA are veriﬁable.
5) The payments contingent on tP and tA are arranged.
6) Contingent on sA and received payments, the agent decides upon retaliation (with
eﬀort q).
For an eﬀort of p the agent incurs costs v(p) with v ∈ C2, v(0) = 0, v′(0) = 0, v′′(p) > 0
and limp→1 v (p) =∞. Had the principal access to the agent’s production technology, his
eﬀort choice would solve v′(p) = φ. For further reference, we will denote the ﬁrst best
eﬀort level by pFB and the respective surplus by ΠFB . Our assumptions on v(p) ensure
that pFB ∈ (0, 1).
The agent is risk-neutral and senses a psychological payoﬀ that depends on his opinion
about his own performance, sA, and the reported opinion of the principal, tP . More
speciﬁcally, the agent’s utility function reads:
(1) U = w − v(p)− Y (tP , sA)(1− q)− c(q)
Thereby, w denotes the wage payment, Y (tP , sA) represents the agent’s psychological
payoﬀ for a given conﬁguration of (reported) signals, q is the level of conﬂict (or retal-
iation) created by the agent and c(q) is the agent’s cost for the level of conﬂict q with
c ∈ C2, c(0) = 0, c′(0) = 0, c′′(q) > 0 and limq→1 c (q) =∞.
On the background of our experimental ﬁndings and the evidence from social psychol-
ogy on self-esteem, ego-threats, and conﬂict creation, we specify Y (tP , sA) as follows.
6All γkl as functions of g, ρ, and x can be found in Appendix B.
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ASSUMPTION 2: (Psychological Costs) (i) Y (tP , sA = L) = 0 for all tP , (ii)
Y (tP = H, sA) = 0 for all sA, and (iii) Y (L,H) > 0.
Part (i) captures that individuals with low self-esteem (represented by sA = L) do not
exhibit ego-involvement and show less reaction to feedback (be it conﬁrming or threat-
ening) [see e.g. Baumeister, Smart & Boden (1996)]. Parts (ii) and (iii) respectively
formalize the ﬁnding that individuals who hold a high opinion about themselves and
are ‘ego-involved’ (sA = H) uncritically accept positive or conﬁrming feedback [see e.g.
Baumeister (2005)] – formalized by zero psychological costs – and suﬀer from negative
or threatening assessments [see e.g. Bushman & Baumeister (1998)] – represented by
non-zero psychological cost in our model. In response to an ego-threat the agent can
reduce his psychological costs that arise from the deviant (reported) opinions about his
performance by creating conﬂict/trouble [as observed by Baird (1977), Shrauger & Lund
(1975) & Korman (1969)]. For further reference, we summarize some results concerning
the agent’s optimal conﬂict level.
LEMMA 1: (Conﬂict Creation) Suppose Y (tP , sA) satisﬁes Assumption 2. Then,
(i) the agent chooses q = argmax(Y (tP , sA)(1− q)− c(q))., (ii) Suppose sA = L and/or
tP = H. Then, Y (tP , sA) = 0 and the agent chooses q = 0, and (iii) Suppose sA = H
and tP = L. Then, the agent chooses q ∈ (0, 1).
According to Lemma 1, the agent creates conﬂict or retaliates (i.e., chooses q > 0) if
and only if sA = H and tP = L, i.e., the agent retaliates if and only if he has a high
opinion of himself and his ego / self-perception is threatened. This corresponds to our
experimental ﬁnding that payoﬀs are only reduced if feedback is below the agent’s self-
evaluation. For further reference we abbreviate Y (L,H) ≡ Y . Moreover, q∗ > 0 will
henceforth denote the conﬂict level for the conﬁguration tP = L and sA = H . As the
agent chooses q = 0 for all other conﬁgurations, no confusion should arise. Note that
the higher the psychological costs created by the diﬀerence in the principal’s and agent’s
evaluation (Y ), the higher the level of conﬂict q∗. We assume throughout this Section
that Assumptions 1 and 2 are satisﬁed.
The principal is risk neutral and maximizes expected proﬁt
(2) Π = pφ− E {w} − E {q}ψ,
where pφ is the expected beneﬁt generated by the agent, E {w} are the expected wage
cost of employing the agent, and E {q}ψ are the expected costs of conﬂict due to re-
taliation. As our assumptions on c(q) ensure that q ∈ [0, 1], we can interpret q as the
probability with which the agent creates costs of ψ > 0 for the principal. First best
proﬁts are given by ΠFB = pFBφ− v(pFB).
A standard application of the revelation principle (for details see Lemma 3 in Ap-
pendix B) implies that we can restrict ourselves – without loss of generality – to simple
bonus contracts (a ﬁxed or up-front payment f independent on reported signals and a
bonus payment b if the principal reports tP = H). In particular, we can restrict ourselves
to bonus payments that are independent of the agent’s (opportunistic) report.
Moral Hazard The principal’s objective to oﬀer a proﬁt maximizing contract – i.e.,
an optimal combination of a ﬁxed payment and a bonus – is burdened with (i) moral
hazard as the agent’s eﬀort is unobservable and (ii) a truth-telling problem as the prin-
cipal has to credibly commit herself to a truthful revelation of her own signal. As long
as the truth-telling constraint is non-binding (pure moral hazard case), the analysis is
a straightforward application of standard incentive theory. The corresponding analysis
is relegated to Appendix B. For further reference, we report the comparative statics of
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optimal eﬀort levels and proﬁts for the pure moral hazard case.7
PROPOSITION 1: (Pure Moral Hazard) There exists φ > 0 such that for φ > φ, (i)
dp˜
dφ > 0,
dp˜
dψ < 0,
dp˜
dg > 0,
dp˜
dρ > 0, and
dp˜
dx < 0 and (ii)
dΠ˜
dφ > 0,
dΠ˜
dψ < 0,
dΠ˜
dg > 0,
dΠ˜
dρ > 0,
and dΠ˜dx < 0.
Hence, if the project is suﬃciently valuable to implement a positive eﬀort level (i.e.,
p˜ > 0 because φ is large compared to costs of eﬀort implementation including the agent’s
eﬀort costs, expected retaliation for the principal, and the expected compensation for the
psychological costs of the agent), an increase in the value of the project certainly enhances
marginal beneﬁts and thereby p˜. Likewise, higher costs of conﬂict for the principal
enhance marginal costs and lower the optimal eﬀort level (recall that signals are conﬂicting
only if the project is successful). A higher quality of the principal’s signal reduces the
probability of conﬂict which reduces marginal costs and leads to higher optimal eﬀort
levels. A higher correlation of signals or a lower quality of an independent judgment
have a similar eﬀect as they also result in lower expected conﬂict levels and a lower
compensation of psychological costs. As indicated in Part (ii), these intuitive eﬀects also
carry over to the comparative statics of the principal’s proﬁt. The higher the value of
the project and the lower expected costs associated with the retaliation of the agent, the
more proﬁt is awarded to the principal. In particular, the principal gains from a decrease
in retaliation costs ψ (i.e. the size of conﬂict), an increase in the principal’s signal quality
g, an increase in the signal correlation ρ and a decrease in the probability that the agent
receives an independent signal x (as all these properties of the information technology
reduce the probability of conﬂict).
As the agent does not receive any rents in the optimal contract, the principal’s proﬁt
also measures the surplus of the relationship. Hence, in the case of non-binding truth-
telling constraints, conﬂicts (i.e. their likelihood γLH and size q∗Ψ – and thereby the
agent’s psychological sensitivity Y ) only have a welfare detrimental eﬀect. Therefore,
any property of the information technology which reduces conﬂict (i.e. an increase in g
or ρ) is welfare-enhancing, while an increase in the quality of the agent’s independent
judgment x induces the adverse eﬀect.
Truth-telling The truth-telling problem can be represented by the following table
(with the principal’s report depicted in the rows, the agent’s report depicted in the
columns, and the principal’s proﬁt as entries).8
H L
H pφ− f − b pφ− f − b
L pφ− f − q∗ψ pφ− f
Suppose sP = H . Then, the principal tells the truth, whenever his payoﬀ from doing
so (which reads pφ− f − b) is larger than his payoﬀ from reporting tP = L (which reads
pφ− f − Pr(sA = H | sP = H)q∗ψ). This means the principal reports tP = H if
(3) b ≤ γHH
(γHH + γHL)
q∗ψ = (ρ + (1− ρ)x)q∗ψ ≡ bmax.
7We denote the optimal eﬀort in the pure moral hazard case by p˜ and the corresponding proﬁt by Π˜.
8In the simple bonus contract (see also Lemma 3 in Appendix B), the agent is indiﬀerent between all
possible reports as his payment (and also his psychological payoﬀ) will be unaﬀected by his own reporting
decision. Hence, we can safely adopt the convention that the agent always tells the truth and omit the
corresponding truth-telling problem. We therefore only depict the principal’s proﬁts in the table.
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The principal can only credibly promise a bonus b below bmax. Note that this upper
bound to credible bonuses increases in the signal correlation ρ and in the quality of an
independent judgment x. An increase in each of these parameters lowers the probability
of the conﬁguration sP = H and sA = L in which case the principal could cheat without
facing retaliation and therefore reduces the incentive to save the bonus payment. More-
over, bmax certainly increases in the level of conﬂict q∗ψ. However, the maximal credible
bonus is independent of g as the principal is only tempted to lie if he received a positive
signal.
If sP = L, the principal tells the truth, whenever his payoﬀ from doing so (which reads
pφ − f − Pr(sA = H | sP = L)q∗ψ) is larger than his payoﬀ from reporting tP = H
(which reads pφ− f − b). Hence, the principal reports tP = L if
(4) b ≥ γLH
(γLH + γLL)
q∗ψ =
(1− ρ)x
(1− ρx)q
∗ψ ≡ bmin.
The principal can also not promise to pay arbitrarily low bonuses as he has an incentive
to evade conﬂict through ‘unconditional bonuses’. By paying the bonus independently
of his signal, the principal avoids any conﬂict with an agent who is prepared to protect
his positive self-image. The minimal credible bonus is thereby decreasing in the signal
correlation ρ and increasing in the quality of an independent judgment x because the
larger ρ and the smaller x the smaller is the probability of the conﬁguration sA = H
and sP = L in which case the principal would beneﬁt from conﬂict evasion. Similarly to
bmax, bmin is independent of g.
Note in particular that bmax > bmin > 0 and that the diﬀerence between bmax and
bmin gets larger and the respective interval is shifted towards larger bonuses as q∗ or ψ
increases. Hence, the larger the potential conﬂict level, the higher are the bonuses that
can be implemented. In fact, for every bonus b there is a conﬂict level ψ such that b is
credible.9 Hence, while elevated levels of conﬂict were only welfare detrimental in the
pure moral hazard case (see Proposition 1), they relax the upper- and tighten the lower
threshold of credible bonuses which will turn out to have an ambiguous eﬀect on welfare.
In the sequel, we call a certain eﬀort level p > 0 implementable if for the incentive
compatible bonus to implement p, b(p), it holds that b(p) ∈ [bmin, bmax]. Furthermore, we
deﬁne the minimum implementable eﬀort pmin and the maximum implementable eﬀort
pmax implicitly by bmin = b(pmin) and bmax = b(pmax). Note that bmax > bmin > 0
implies pmax > pmin > 0. Let us denote the optimal eﬀort level by p∗ and corresponding
proﬁts by Π∗. If the value of the project is suﬃciently large to establish a relationship10
one can distinguish between three cases (see Proposition 5 in Appendix B): i) the case
of a binding lower truth-telling constraint, ii) the case of a binding upper truth-telling
constraint, and iii) the case of a non-binding truth-telling constraint. The comparative
statics in the latter case have already been analyzed in Proposition 1 (as the principal
simply implements p∗ = p˜ in this case). The analysis of cases i) and ii) deserves some
more attention. To this end, the following Lemma captures the comparative statics of
pmin and pmax with respect to the level of conﬂict and the parameters of the information
technology.
LEMMA 2: (Truth-Telling Constraints) (i) dp
min
dΨ > 0 and
dpmax
dΨ > 0. (ii)
dpmax
dg >
9A comprehensive discussion of the comparative statics of bmax and bmin can be found in Appendix B.
10We show in Appendix B that there exists φ > 0 with φ > φ such that it is optimal for the principal to
implement a positive eﬀort level whenever φ > φ. Hence, the truth-telling constraint aggravates agency
costs and thereby requires larger project values than in the pure moral hazard case for the optimality of
positive eﬀorts.
14
0 and dp
min
dg > 0. (iii)
dpmax
dρ > 0 and
dpmin
dρ < 0 if ψ is suﬃciently large. (iv)
dpmax
dx > 0
and dp
min
dx > 0 if ψ is suﬃciently large.
Proof. See Appendix A.
As the level of conﬂict ψ lifts the minimal credible bonus bmin and the maximal credible
bonus bmax while leaving the incentive compatible bonus b(p) unaltered, pmin and pmax
increase in ψ (Part (i)). Intuitively, the more conﬂict, the less tempting it is to cheat on
the agent (upper truth-telling constraint) and the more tempting it is to evade conﬂict
through unconditional bonus-payments (lower truth-telling constraint).
In contrast, a higher quality of the principal’s signal g lowers the incentive compatible
bonus b(p) (as bonuses are paid more often) but leaves bmin and bmax unaltered. Hence,
the better the principal’s signal, the less costly is the implementation of a certain eﬀort
level and the higher is the maximal implementable eﬀort pmax. However, lower costs of
eﬀort implementation also increase the minimal eﬀort level that can credibly be imple-
mented (pmin) (Part (ii)).
In contrast to this, the impact of ρ and x on pmin and pmax is more subtle (see Parts
(iii) and (iv)). These parameters of the information technology inﬂuence the minimal,
the maximal and the incentive compatible bonus. As a result, ρ and x have a direct
and an indirect eﬀect on pmin and pmax. Both parameters modify the probability with
which the principal could gain from a lie, but also change the expected psychological
costs which have to be compensated by the incentive compatible bonus. Part (iii) and
(iv) of Lemma 2 show that, if ψ is suﬃciently large such that the gains from a lie are
suﬃciently pronounced, the former eﬀect dominates the latter.
Welfare Analysis To analyze the comparative statics of the surplus (which is iden-
tical to the principal’s proﬁts in our set-up), observe that the impact of a parameter y
on proﬁts Π(p) can be written as dΠ(p)dy =
∂Π(p)
∂y +
∂Π
∂p
dp
dy . We will refer to the ﬁrst term
as the direct eﬀect and the second as the indirect eﬀect. The direct eﬀect captures the
impact of the parameter on proﬁts for a given eﬀort level. By the envelope theorem, this
fully determines the comparative statics of equilibrium proﬁts in the pure moral hazard
case (recall that ∂Π∂p = 0 for p = p˜) as depicted in Proposition 1(iii). For a binding truth-
telling constraint, the indirect eﬀect can no longer be neglected and may well dominate
and reverse the comparative statics of the pure moral hazard case as demonstrated by
the following result.
PROPOSITION 2: (Comparative Statics of Welfare) (i) There exists φ˜ such that
dΠ∗
dψ > 0 for all φ > φ˜. (ii) There exists φ, Y and v(p) such that
dΠ∗
dg < 0. (iii) There
exists φ˜ and ψ˜ such that dΠ
∗
dx > 0 if ψ > ψ˜ and φ > φ˜.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition 2 indicates two diﬀerent eﬀects which may reverse the comparative statics
of the pure moral hazard case. First, the upper truthtelling constraint may be binding.
This is in particular the case for large project values φ which induce large marginal
beneﬁts and therefore require optimal eﬀort levels beyond pmax. An increase in ψ or x
is welfare detrimental for a given eﬀort level (i.e. ( ∂Π∂ψ,x ) < 0) but also pushes p
max (as
indicated in Lemma 2, pmax is increasing in Ψ and increasing in x if Ψ is suﬃciently large)
and thereby relaxes the upper truth-telling constraint. As indicated by Proposition 2(i)
and (iii), the latter (indirect) eﬀects indeed dominate the former (direct) eﬀects if project
values are suﬃciently large. Hence, higher probabilities or levels of conﬂict are welfare
enhancing in the case of valuable projects for which the upper truth-telling constraint is
binding.
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Second, the lower truthtelling constraint may be binding. This is in particular the
case for small project values which are suﬃciently attractive to sign contracts on small
positive eﬀort levels but operate with bonus payments which tempt the principal to evade
conﬂict by paying the bonus unconditional on the signal. In this case, the principal suﬀers
from parameter changes which tighten the lower truthtelling constraint. For instance, the
higher the quality of the principal’s signal g, the larger pmin and the more tight the lower
truthtelling constraint. In contrast, an increase in g enhances the principal’s proﬁt for
a given eﬀort level. According to Proposition 2(ii) the latter (direct) eﬀect may well
be dominated by the former (indirect) eﬀect. As a consequence, a better signal for the
principal may be welfare detrimental in the case of small projects for which the lower
truth-telling constraint is binding.
Note that similar detrimental eﬀects cannot be derived for the correlation of signals ρ,
as a higher correlation directly enhances the principal’s proﬁt and relaxes the lower and
the upper truthtelling constraint as long as ψ is suﬃciently large (see Lemma 2(iii)).
We conclude with a comparison of equilibrium proﬁts with the ﬁrst best solution and
a discussion of the limit of a perfect signal to the principal, perfectly correlated signals,
and no correct independent judgment of the agent.
PROPOSITION 3: (First Best Comparison) (i) Suppose g < 1, ρ < 1, and x > 0.
Then, Π∗ < ΠFB . (ii) Let ρ = 1 and/or x = 0. Then, p∗ = pFB and Π∗ = ΠFB if
and only if φg ≤ ρq∗ψ. (iii) Let g = 1. Then, p∗ = pFB and Π∗ = ΠFB if and only if
(1−ρ)x
1−ρx q
∗ψ ≤ φ ≤ (ρ + (1 − ρ)x)q∗ψ
Proof. See Appendix A.
Part i) indicates that an imperfect information technology of the principal together
with an imperfect correlation of the principal’s and the agent’s signals, and at least some
correct independent judgment of the agent induces a welfare loss.
In Part ii) it can be seen that, if signals are perfectly correlated (ρ = 1) or the agent’s
independent judgement never identiﬁes a good project (x = 0), a ﬁrst best will be reached
whenever the respective incentive compatible bonus b(pFB) =
v′(pFB)
g =
φ
g is credible,
i.e., b(pFB) ≤ bmax. As the minimal credible bonus bmin is zero for ρ = 1 or x = 0, only
the upper truth-telling constraint matters in this case and a ﬁrst best will be established,
if the project value is not too large relative to the expected costs of retaliation.
This changes if we consider the limit g = 1. Again, a ﬁrst best is reached whenever the
incentive compatible bonus b(pFB) = φ is credible. However, as bmin =
(1−ρ)x
1−ρx q
∗ψ does
not vanish as long as ρ < 1 and x > 0, the ﬁrst best eﬀort can be too large or too small
to be implementable. Hence, it requires a ‘ﬁne-tuning’ of φ (relative to expected costs of
conﬂict) to guarantee a ﬁrst best solution in this case.
IV. Concluding Remarks
The objective of our paper was twofold. First, we conducted an experiment with sub-
jective performance evaluation and feedback to investigate individual incentives to create
conﬂict in response to a tension between self-perception and performance evaluations by
others. Our experimental data indicates that individuals tend to create conﬂict whenever
their own evaluation exceeds the feedback by another party (regardless of whether the
feedback also determines the distribution of payoﬀs or not). This suggests that individ-
uals regard feedback below their self-perception as an ego-threat that triggers attempts
to protect one’s self-esteem through the creation of conﬂict.
Second, we propose a simple principal agent model that captures an agent’s eagerness
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to protect his self-esteem and demonstrate how this facilitates principal-agent relation-
ships even if performance signals are subjective, parties do not interact repetitively, and
no third-party can enforce truth-telling. In particular, we analyzed the impact of the
conﬂict level, the psychological sensitivity to ego-threats, and the quality of the informa-
tion technology on optimal eﬀort levels and social welfare.
Conflict Level Conﬂict as modeled in this paper unambiguously reduces optimal ef-
fort levels and social welfare in the absence of truth-telling constraints. In the presence
of truth-telling constraints, however, we show that some conﬂict potential is needed to
establish a positive eﬀort by the agent and that enhanced conﬂict levels have a positive
eﬀect on social welfare in the case of valuable projects which require substantial bonus
payments to the agent. E.g., a well-established (internal or external) system of appeals
against managerial decision making is not only providing a more peaceful workforce, it
may also create the conﬂict opportunities needed to make bonus payments credible and
thereby raise ﬁrm proﬁts. The importance of credible conﬂict for principal agent relations
with subjective information has also been emphasized by McLeod (2003). However, while
McLeod (2003) assumed that the principal could optimally choose conﬂict levels (through
credible payments to a third party in case of conﬂicting reports), we rather investigate
how psychological costs as identiﬁed in our experiment may serve the same purpose.
Sensitivity to Ego-Threats Higher levels of conﬂict unambiguously raise the maxi-
mum credible bonus and thereby relax the upper truth-telling constraint in a potentially
welfare enhancing way. In contrast, the impact of the psychological sensitivity to ego-
threats is more subtle. First of all, some sensitivity is needed to establish the prospect
of conﬂict for the principal and thereby ensure truth-telling. The more aggressive the
agent reacts to ego-threats, the higher the anticipated level of conﬂict and the less re-
strictive the upper truth-telling constraint. Hence, a more aggressive agent will induce a
welfare improvement in case of valuable projects. However, the higher the sensitivity of
the agent, the larger the required compensation for anticipated psychological costs. This
ceteris paribus enhances necessary bonus payments for a given eﬀort level and thereby
reduces the principal’s proﬁt and social welfare. The ideal agent from the point of view
of a principal who wishes to conduct a very valuable project is therefore someone who
reacts very aggressively to ego-threats (i.e., who has low costs of retaliation) but does
not suﬀer too much from an ego-threat and the corresponding retaliation (e.g. because
q∗ is large). This reinforces our above-made appraisal of appeal systems and suggests to
ensure low costs of conﬂict creation for the employee (e.g. low costs of law suits etc.).
Note, however, that these recommendations only hold for very valuable projects which
make the upper truthtelling constraint binding. For non-binding truthtelling constraints,
psychological sensitivity and the corresponding conﬂict remains detrimental to the prin-
cipal’s proﬁts and welfare.
Information Technology We also analyzed the impact of the information technol-
ogy on optimal eﬀorts and welfare. First of all, the principal is advised to use a signal
technology which sends a perfectly correlated signal to her and the agent. With perfectly
correlated signals the probability of conﬂicting signals is zero such that the agent does
not expect any psychological costs. Moreover, the lower (upper) truthtelling constraint is
decreasing (increasing) in the signal correlation such that the interval of credible bonuses
is maximized for a given conﬂict level. Whenever the ﬁrst best bonus is credible for
perfectly correlated signals, a ﬁrst best will also be reached – in the absence of limited
liability or problems of risk allocation as it is the case in our set-up. This lends support
to the practice of using information for performance evaluation which is not necessarily
highly correlated with actual performance but ensures a high correlation with the agent’s
self-assessment. Similarly, the probability of conﬂict will be zero if the agent does not
observe good performance independent of the principal. Hence, a ﬁrst best can also be
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achieved with agents who lack an informative independent judgment (i.e., if x = 0). How-
ever, minimal and maximal implementable eﬀorts are increasing in x (for high conﬂict
levels), such that implementability of the ﬁrst best is less straightforward for x = 0 than
for perfectly correlated signals.
The impact of the quality of the principal’s signal has shown to be subtle. A better
signal reduces necessary bonus payments (due to higher expected returns and lower psy-
chological costs for the agent) and thereby lowers agency costs which yields a welfare
improvement – unless the lower truthtelling constraint binds, which may be the case for
less valuable projects. Hence, the principal cannot expect higher proﬁts from employing
a better information technology for all project values. As a consequence he would not
always choose a perfect information technology even if this was costless. The optimal
choice of an information technology rather deals with a trade-oﬀ between agency costs
(which are decreasing in the signal quality) and truthtelling constraints (which may well
be tightened by a better information technology). Hence, imperfect information tech-
nologies as observed in reality may not only be optimal due to cost considerations but
also due to the strategic aspects discussed in this paper.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 2
pmin is implicitly given by
bmin =
(1− ρ)x
1− ρx q
∗ψ =
1
g
(v′(pmin) + (1 − g)(1− ρ)x(Y (1 − q∗) + c(q∗))) = b(pmin)
and pmax is implicitly given by
bmax = (ρ + (1 − ρ)x)q∗ψ
=
1
g
(v′(pmax) + (1− g)(1− ρ)x(Y (1− q∗) + c(q∗))) = b(pmax).
We use these equations to compute the comparative statics of pmin and pmax. To be
speciﬁc, let Fmin = bmin − b(p) and Fmax = bmax − b(p). Then, for a parameter y,
dpmin/max
dy = −∂F
min/max/∂y
∂Fmin/max/∂p
. Note that ∂F
min/max
∂p = − v
′′(p)
g < 0.
Part (i). Follows from ∂b
min−b(p)
∂ψ =
(1−ρ)x
1−ρx q
∗ > 0 and ∂b
max−b(p)
∂ψ = (ρ+(1−ρ)x)q∗ > 0.
Part (ii). Observe that ∂b
min−b(p)
∂g =
b(pmin)
g +
1
g ((1− ρ)x(Y (1− q∗) + c(q∗))) > 0 and
∂bmax−b(p)
∂g =
b(p)
g +
1
g ((1 − ρ)x(Y (1− q∗) + c(q∗))) > 0.
Part (iii). ∂b
min−b(p)
∂ρ =
−x(1−x)
(1−ρx)2 q
∗ψ + 1g ((1 − g)x(Y (1 − q∗) + c(q∗))) is negative if ψ
is suﬃciently large (for a given 0 < x < 1). Moreover, ∂b
max−b(p)
∂ρ = (1 − x)q∗ψ + 1g ((1 −
g)x(Y (1− q∗) + c(q∗))) > 0.
Part (iv). ∂b
min−b(p)
∂x =
1−ρ
(1−ρx)2 q
∗ψ − 1g ((1− g)(1− ρ)(Y (1− q∗) + c(q∗))) is positive if
ψ is suﬃciently large. ∂b
max−b(p)
∂x = (1 − ρ)q∗ψ − 1g ((1 − g)(1− ρ)(Y (1− q∗) + c(q∗))) is
positive if ψ is suﬃciently large.
Proof of Proposition 2
The impact of a parameter y on equilibrium proﬁts Π(p∗) can be denoted by dΠ(p
∗)
dy =
∂Π(p∗)
∂y +
∂Π(p∗)
∂p
dp∗
dy . For
∂Π(p)
∂y see the proof of Proposition 1(iii).
∂Π(p)
∂p = Φ− γLHq∗ψ−
v′(p)−γLH(Y (1−q∗)+c(q∗)). Note that for a ﬁxed p, ∂Π(p)∂p is a linear increasing function
of φ and for a ﬁxed φ it is a decreasing function of p with slope −v′′(p).
Part (i). Recall from Lemma 2(i) that dp
max
dψ > 0. Fix any p
max ∈ (0, 1). Then, there
exists a project value φ′ such that ∂Π(p)∂p |p=pmax > 0 and p∗ = pmax for all φ > φ′. In
particular, ∂Π(p)∂p |p=p∗ dp
∗
dψ > 0. As
dpmax
dψ and
∂Π(p)
∂ψ are independent of φ and
∂Π(p)
∂p is a
linear increasing function of φ, there exists a φ′′ such that dΠ(p
∗)
dψ > 0 for all φ > φ˜ ≡
max (φ′, φ′′).
Part (ii). Fix any pmin ∈ (0, 1) and a positive real number z. Then, there exists
an eﬀort cost function v(p) such that v
′(pmin)
v′′(pmin) > z and there exists a project value
φ such that 0 < p˜ < pmin and Π(pmin) > 0 (and therefore p∗ = pmin). Then, by
Lemma 2(ii), dp
min
dg > 0 and
∂Π(p)
∂g = −pdγLHdg (q∗Ψ + (Y (1 − q∗) + c(q∗))) > 0 (see the
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proof of Proposition 1). Now observe that ∂Π(p)∂g is independent of v(p) and its derivatives
while ∂Π∂p
∂pmin
∂g is increasing in
v′(p)
v′′(p) . Hence,
dΠ(p)
dg < 0 if z is suﬃciently large.
Part (iii). Recall from Lemma 2(iv) that there exists a ψ˜ such that dp
max
dx > 0 for all
ψ > ψ˜. Fix any pmax ∈ (0, 1) with such a ψ. Then, there exists a project value φ′ such
that ∂Π(p)∂p |p=pmax > 0 and p∗ = pmax for all φ > φ′. In particular, ∂Π(p)∂p |p=p∗ dp
∗
dx > 0.
As dp
max
dx and
∂Π(p)
∂x are independent of φ and
∂Π(p)
∂p is a linear increasing function of φ,
there exists a φ′′ such that dΠ(p
∗)
dx > 0 for all φ > φ˜ ≡ max (φ′, φ′′).
Proof of Proposition 3
Part (i). Follows from non-zero psychological costs and costs of conﬂict in this case.
Part (ii) and (iii). g = 1, ρ = 1, or x = 0 implies that γLH = 0 and therefore
Π(p) = pφ−v(p) such that p˜ = pFB. However, b(pFB) has to be in the interval [bmin, bmax]
which results in the condition displayed in the proposition (recall that for x = 0 or ρ = 1,
bmin = 0).
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Appendix B
Information Technology
Conditional probabilities γk,l for signal conﬁguration (sP = k,sA = l) are
γHH = g (ρ + (1− ρ) x) and γHL = g(1− ρ)(1 − x),
γLL = (1 − g) (ρ + (1− ρ) (1 − x)) and γLH = (1− g) (1− ρ)x.
Reduced Form Contracts
In our setting with unobservable eﬀort and subjective measures of performance, a
contract Γ can only be contingent on the reported subjective opinions of the principal
and the agent. Hence, a contract ﬁxes payments for all conﬁgurations of reports tP and
tA and reads Γ = {wkl | k ∈ SP , l ∈ SA}. The agent accepts a contract if he expects
a (weakly) positive utility from it (individual rationality) and chooses p as to maximize
his utility (incentive compatibility). If a contract Γ is individually rational and the agent
chooses eﬀort p, we say that Γ implements p. Principal and agent report their opinions,
i.e. signals, truthfully if and only if they weakly beneﬁt from doing so.
LEMMA 3: Reduced Form Contracts
Suppose there exists a contract Γ which implements p > 0. Then, there always exists a
contract Γˆ which implements p at weakly lower costs and (i) principal and agent tell the
truth, (ii) wkl = wkm ≡ wk for all k ∈ SP and l,m ∈ SA, and (iii) wH > wL.
PROOF:
To save on notation, we denote Y (tP = l, sA = k)(1 − q∗) − c(q∗) ≡ Ykl throughout
this proof.
Part(i). For a given contract Γ and signals sP and sA, the principal and the agent
decide upon their report. Let σP : SP → Δ(SP ) and σA : SA → Δ(SA) be the principal’s
and agent’s reporting strategies (i.e., mappings from the set of signals SP and SA to the
set of probability distributions over SP and SA, respectively). Suppose that (σ∗P , σ
∗
A) is
the pair of optimal reporting strategies for contract Γ. Then, the revelation principle
implies that there exists a contract Γˆ which implements the same eﬀort at the same costs
and induces truthful reports by principal and agent. We will, henceforth, restrict our
analysis to this type of (revelation) contracts.
Part (ii). Suppose that Γ = {wkl} is a revelation contract, i.e., the principal and the
agent tell the truth under contract Γ. As Γ implements p > 0, the incentive compatibility
constraint
Σk∈SP ,l∈SA(wkl − Ykl)
dPr{sP = k, sA = l}
dp
= v′(p)
is satisﬁed. Consider a contract Γˆ which ﬁxes payments of
wˆk =
∑
l∈SA
wklPr{sP = k, sA = l}
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if the principal receives signal sP = k, i.e., payments are independent of sA. These
payments also satisfy the incentive compatibility constraint (see above).11 Moreover,
the agent weakly beneﬁts from telling the truth. Finally, the principal’s truth-telling
constraint is also satisﬁed under Γˆ. To see this observe that the principal reports k given
that he has received k under contract Γ if
Pr{sA = H | sP = k}(woH − wkH) + Pr{sA = L|sP = k}(woL − wkL)
≥ Pr{sA = H |sP = k}((q∗ψ)kH − (q∗ψ)oH)
+Pr{sA = L|sP = k}((q∗ψ)kL − (q∗ψ)oL)(5)
for all o ∈ SP (where (q∗ψ)tA,tP denotes the anticipated conﬂict costs for a reported
conﬁguration (tA, tP )). This set of inequalities holds because Γ implements truth-telling
by assumption. Γˆ implements truth-telling if
wˆo − wˆk ≥ Pr{sA = H |sP = k}((q∗ψ)kH − (q∗ψ)oH)
+Pr{sA = L|sP = k}((q∗ψ)kL − (q∗ψ)oL).
holds for all o, k ∈ SP . Inserting wˆk and wˆo yields
Pr{sA = H |sP = k}(woH − ckH) + Pr{sA = L|sP = k}(woL − wkL)
≥ Pr{sA = H |sP = k}((q∗ψ)kH − (q∗ψ)oH)
+Pr{sA = L|sP = k}((q∗ψ)kL − (q∗ψ)oL).
which coincides with Eqs. 5 and therefore shows that for Γˆ the principal’s truthtelling
constraint is satisﬁed as well. Hence, any revelation contract Γ can be substituted by a
revelation contract Γˆ with wkl independent of l which also implements p > 0 and leaves
the principal weakly better oﬀ.
Part (iii). Suppose by contradiction that Γ implements p > 0 with wH = g and
wL = g +  with  ≥ 0. Then, the incentive compatibility constraint of the agent can be
written as
 =
v′(p) + γLHYLH
(γLH + γLL − 1) .
Observe that the numerator of the rhs is strictly positive and the denominator is strictly
negative. Hence, the rhs is strictly negative and the incentive compatibility constraint is
not satisﬁed for any  ≥ 0. A contradiction.
Pure Moral Hazard Problem
In this section we abstract from the truthtelling problem inherent to the principal-
agent relationship in order to analyze the isolated impact of moral hazard on the optimal
eﬀort level chosen by the principal and social welfare. Hence, we assume throughout this
section that the contract Γ = (f, b) guarantees truth-telling (i.e., truth-telling constraints
are non-binding).
For a given contract Γ = (f, b), the agent chooses eﬀort p as to maximize his utility
(see Eqn. 1) while anticipating the generation of ex-post conﬂict at level q∗ as depicted
11Individual rationality is trivially fulﬁlled as expected payments for the agent are the same under Γ
and Γˆ, and Γ is individually rational by assumption.
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in Lemma 1. This means, he maximizes
U(p) = p(γHH + γHL)b + f − v(p)− pγLH(Y (1− q∗) + c(q∗))
which induces the ﬁrst order condition12
b(p) =
v′(p) + γLH(Y (1 − q∗) + c(q∗))
γHH + γHL
=
1
g
(v′(p) + (1− g)(1− ρ)x(Y (1− q∗) + c(q∗))).(6)
Note that d
2U(p)
dp2 = v
′′(p) > 0 such that the agent’s optimization problem is well-behaved.
Eqn. (6) shows that the incentive compatible bonus that the principal pays to the agent
in case he beliefs that the agent did a good job has to overcome marginal eﬀort costs
and marginal psychological costs. If the principal wants to induce a positive eﬀort level,
he has to oﬀer a positive bonus. Note, however, that the required bonus does not van-
ish in the limit of small eﬀorts, because marginal psychological costs do not vanish for
p = 0. Finally, observe that the incentive compatible bonus increases in target eﬀort p,
psychological costs Y , and the conditional probability of conﬂict (γLH). In particular, a
higher quality of the principal’s signal g reduces the incentive compatible bonus because
the agent expects higher returns to eﬀort and the probability of conﬂict decreases. Like-
wise, a lower correlation of the signals or a higher probability of a positive independent
evaluation by the agent enhances the compensation requested by the agent for a given
eﬀort level.
The agent accepts a contract Γ = (f, b) whenever his expected utility from it is weakly
positive, i.e.
p(γHH + γHL)b + f − v(p)− pγLH(Y (1− q∗) + c(q∗)) ≥ 0.
To maximize her proﬁts, the principal sets the upfront payment for a given bonus b to
f(b) = −p(γHH + γHL)b + v(p) + pγLH(Y (1− q∗) + c(q∗)).
Observe that the upfront-payment can well be negative (i.e., a franchise fee) as the agent
is not protected by limited liability. Note in particular that f(b) can always be ﬁxed such
that the agent does not receive any rents from the relationship.
To implement eﬀort p > 0 the principal’s costs are C(p) = f + p(γHH + γHL)b(p) =
v(p) + pγLH((1− q∗)Y + c(q∗)). Note that C(p) is convex and that C(0) = 0. We adopt
the convention that an eﬀort p > 0 which is not implementable requires inﬁnite costs.
The principal’s proﬁt now reads
Π(p) = pφ− pγLHq∗ψ − C(p)
which is zero for p = 0 and concave for p > 0. We denote the maximum of Π(p) on [0, 1]
by p˜ and the corresponding proﬁt for the principal by Π˜ and derive the following set of
results.13
PROPOSITION 4: Pure Moral Hazard
12We denote a bonus which implements an eﬀort level of p by b(p).
13p˜ and Π˜ are equilibrium eﬀort and proﬁt whenever the truth-telling constraints are non-binding.
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(i) p˜ > 0 if and only if φ > φ ≡ γLH(q∗Ψ+ ((1 − q∗)Y + c(q∗))).
(ii) Suppose φ > φ. Then, dp˜dφ > 0,
dp˜
dψ < 0,
dp˜
dg > 0,
dp˜
dρ > 0, and
dp˜
dx < 0.
(iii) Suppose φ > φ. Then, dΠ˜dφ > 0,
dΠ˜
dψ < 0,
dΠ˜
dg > 0,
dΠ˜
dρ > 0, and
dΠ˜
dx < 0.
PROOF:
Part(i). Consider
Π(p) = pφ− pγLHq∗ψ − C(p)
with C(p) = v(p) + pγLH((1 − q∗)Y + c(q∗)). Observe that Π = ap − v(p) with a =
φ − γLH(q∗Ψ + ((1 − q∗)Y + c(q∗))). Recall that v(0) = 0, v′(0) = 0, and v′′(p) > 0.
Then, p˜ > 0 if and only if a > 0.
Part (ii). We use the ﬁrst order condition
(7)
dΠ
dp
= φ− γLHq∗ψ − v′(p)− γLH(Y (1 − q∗) + c(q∗)) = 0.
as an implicit function of p˜. With we get
dp˜
dφ
= − 1−v′′(p˜) > 0,
dp˜
dψ
= −−γLHq
∗
−v′′(p˜) < 0,
dp˜
dγLH
= −−q
∗ψ − (Y (1 − q∗) + c(q∗))
−v′′(p˜) < 0,
dp˜
dY
= −−γLHψ
dq∗
dY − γLH(1 − q∗)
−v′′(p˜) < 0.
which implies Part (ii) (recall that dγLHdg < 0,
dγLH
dρ < 0, and
dγLH
dx > 0).
Part (iii). Follows directly from
∂Π(p)
∂φ
= p > 0,
∂Π(p)
∂Ψ
= −pγLHq∗ < 0,
∂Π(p)
∂g
= −pdγLH
dg
(q∗Ψ+ (Y (1 − q∗)− c(q∗))) > 0,
∂Π(p)
∂ρ
= −pdγLH
dρ
(q∗Ψ+ (Y (1 − q∗)− c(q∗))) > 0,
∂Π(p)
∂x
= −pdγLH
dx
(q∗Ψ+ (Y (1− q∗)− c(q∗))) < 0
for any p > 0 and the envelope theorem dΠ˜dy =
∂Π
∂y |p=p˜ for a parameter y.
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Comparative Statics of Bonuses
Recall that b(p) = v
′(p)+γLH(Y (1−q∗)+c(q∗))
γHH+γHL
= 1g (v
′(p)+(1−g)(1−ρ)x(Y (1−q∗)+c(q∗)))
which implies.
LEMMA 4: Comparative Statics of b(p)
(i) Suppose p > 0. Then, b(p) > 0. (ii) limp→0 b(p) > 0. (iii)
db(p)
dp > 0. (iv)
db(p)
dg < 0.
(v) db(p)dρ < 0. (vi)
db(p)
dx > 0.
The deﬁnition of bmin and bmax
bmax =
γHH
(γHH + γHL)
q∗ψ = (ρ + (1 − ρ)x)q∗ψ
bmin =
γLH
(γLH + γLL)
q∗ψ =
(1 − ρ)x
(1 − ρx)q
∗ψ
implies the following results.
LEMMA 5: Comparative Statics of bmax and bmin
(i) bmin > 0. (ii) bmax > bmin. (iii) Δb ≡ bmax− bmin is monotone increasing in q∗ and
ψ. (iv) bmin is monotone increasing in q∗, ψ, and x and monotone decreasing in ρ. (v)
bmax is monotone increasing in q∗, ψ, ρ, and x. (vi) Both bmax and bmin are independent
on g.
PROOF:
(i) and (ii) follow from the positive correlation of signals, i.e., ρ > 0 or γHHγLL >
γHLγLH .
(iii) Follows from Δb = γHHγLL−γHLγLH(γHH+γHL)+(γLH+γLL)q
∗ψ.
(iv), (v), and (vi) follow directly from Eqs 3 and 4.
Truth-telling problem
We denote the maximum of Π(p) = pφ − pγLHq∗ψ − C(p) on {0} ∪ [pmin, pmax] by
p∗. p∗ will be referred to as the optimal eﬀort level (p∗ is the optimal eﬀort level for the
principal given that only eﬀort levels between pmin and pmax are feasible) and Π∗ = Π(p∗)
will be the corresponding proﬁt for the principal.
PROPOSITION 5: Optimal Eﬀort Level
p∗ > 0 if and only if φ > φ > φ with Π(pmin)|φ=φ = 0.
Now suppose that φ > φ.
(i) Binding Lower Truth-Telling Constraint: If 0 < p˜ < pmin, then the principal im-
plements p∗ = pmin with bonus bmin [Figure 1].
(ii) Binding Upper Truth-Telling Constraint: If p˜ > pmax, then the principal imple-
ments p∗ = pmax with bonus bmax [Figure 2].
(iii) Non-Binding Truth-Telling Constraint: If p˜ ∈ [pmin, pmax], then the principal im-
plements p∗ = p˜ by paying b(p˜) [Figure 3].
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PROOF:
′′ ⇐′′ Suppose φ > φ. As ∂Π∂φ > 0, Π(pmin)|φ > 0 = Π(p = 0) and therefore p∗ > 0. By
Proposition 1, this implies that φ ≤ φ.
′′ ⇒′′ Suppose p∗ > 0. Then, φ > φ (see Proposition 1). Hence, Π(p) is continuous in
p ≥ 0 and concave with a unique maximum at p˜ > 0. Now suppose that φ < φ such that
Π(pmin)|φ < 0. Then, p˜ < pmin and Π(p) < 0 for all p ∈ [pmin, pmax]. A contradiction.
To see that φ = φ, recall from Lemma 5 that bmin > 0 which implies pmin > 0.
Now suppose that φ = φ = φ. Then, Π(pmin) = 0 by deﬁnition of Φ. Then, conti-
nuity and concavity of Π(p) imply 0 < p˜ < pmin where the ﬁrst inequality contradicts
Proposition 1(i).
Items (i) to (iii) are a direct implication of the fact that Π(p) is continuous in p ≥ 0
and concave with a unique maximum at p˜ > 0 whenever φ > φ, and the observation that
pmax > pmin > 0.
According to Proposition 5, there will be no principal-agent relationship (i.e. p∗ = 0)
whenever the returns to the project are below a certain threshold. Note in particular,
that the presence of a truth-telling problem increases the corresponding threshold value
compared to the pure moral hazard case (φ > φ) which already indicates potential welfare
losses due to truth-telling constraints. Finally, observe that in the absence of conﬂict (i.e.,
q∗Ψ = 0) it holds that (pmin = 0) such that proﬁts for the principal are zero at pmin for
any φ. This establishes the familiar result that no positive eﬀort can be implemented in
the absence of conﬂict if performance evaluations are subjective.
[Figures A.1-A.3 here]
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Figure A.1. : Binding Lower Truth-Telling Con-
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Figure A.2. : Binding Upper Truth-Telling
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Figure A.3. : Non-Binding Truth-Telling Constraint
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Appendix C
Experimental instructions
Dear Participant, 
Welcome to the experiment.  
 
 . 
 
 
 
This experiment is a project from researchers from the University of Copenhagen and Bamberg 
University (Germany). It studies people’s behavior in work situations. 
You can earn money in this experiment. The amount of money that you will receive depends on 
your decisions as well as another person’s decisions. All earnings will be paid out at the end of 
the experiment. 
During the experiment, your income will be calculated in points. These points are converted 
into Danish kroner (DKK) according to the following exchange rate: 
 
In this experiment you will be randomly grouped into pairs and assigned to one of two different 
roles. We name these roles Person A and Person B. This means, during the experiment you will 
be paired with one other person in this room and you will be either Person A or Person B. If you 
are Person A, you will be paired with Person B and vice versa. 
Note, both of you start with an endowment of 200 points in the beginning of the experiment 
that will be part of your final payoff.  
On the following page we will reveal your role, i.e. Person A or Person B, 
and explain to you what the experiment is about.  
10 points = 3.5 DKK 
Important: Please do not communicate with other participants during the experiment and 
switch off your mobile phones. Read the instructions carefully. If something is not well 
explained or any question turns up now or at any time later in the experiment, then ask one 
of the experimenters. Do, however, not ask out loud, but raise your hand! We will clarify 
questions privately. You can use the instructions throughout the experiment whenever you 
want to re-clarify certain things and you may take notes on them, if you wish. 
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You have randomly been assigned to the role of Person B.  
During this experiment you are paired with another person in this room: Person A.  
The experiment has 4 stages:  
Stage 1 (Questions): After reading the instructions, please answer the questions that you find 
on the screen. These questions are related to the instructions and they should check in how far 
the information in the instructions is clear. Please answer all the questions. When Person A has 
answered the questions a “Next” button will appear at the bottom of your screen. Please click 
it. When the answers to all questions are correct, clicking the button “Next” will start stage 2 of 
the experiment. 
Stage 2 (Clicking-Task): You will be given a task. The task that you will be given is “clicking away 
boxes”. This means, for a period of 90 seconds screens with boxes will appear for various time 
lengths and your task is to click the boxes away.  
Note, Person A will be able to observe on his screen how you work on your task. This means, he 
/ she will see the same screen as you and observe you clicking away the boxes.  
Important: your performance will generate Person A’s payoff. 
If you click away: 
? 0-20% of the boxes that appear during the 90 sec., then Person A will receive 200 points,  
? 20-40% of the boxes that appear during the 90 sec., then Person A will receive 300 points, 
? 40-60% of the boxes that appear during the 90 sec., then Person A will receive 400 points,  
? 60-80% of the boxes that appear during the 90 sec., then Person A will receive 500 points, 
? 80-100% of the boxes that appear during the 90 sec., then Person A will receive 600 points. 
Stage 3 (Evaluation and Feedback): After the clicking-task, both of you will be asked to evaluate 
your performance. Note, these evaluations will NOT be communicated to the person that your 
30
Appendix C
Experimental instructions
are paired with. In addition, you will be given feedback by Person A which is communicated to 
you at the end of the experiment. 
Important: by giving feedback to you, Person A decides how much he / she wants to give you 
from his / her payoff that was generated through your performance during the clicking-task.  
If Person A’s feedback is: 
? 0-20%, then you receive 100 points from Person A,  
? 20-40%, then you receive 150 points from Person A,  
? 40-60%, then you receive 200 points from Person A,  
? 60-80%, then you receive 250 points from Person A, 
? 80-100%, then you receive 300 points from Person A. 
Stage 4 (Reaction): Following the feedback stage, you will be able to use the 200 points initial 
endowment and the points that you receive because of Person A’s feedback to react to his / her 
evaluation of your performance. This means, you will be asked by how much you would like to 
reduce Person A’s payoff given his / her feedback.  
Your answer to this question can reduce Person A’s payoff by up to 100 points. However, note 
that for every point that you reduce Person A’s payoff, you have to pay 0.25 points. This means, 
for example, a reduction of 40 points of Person A’s payoff, costs you 10 points etc.    
Important: Note, neither you nor Person A will be informed about your actual performance in 
the clicking-task before the end of the experiment. So all decisions that you and Person A take 
during the experiment are based on your own subjective opinions. Note, however, that 
whatever decision you take your final payoff will NOT be negative. 
On the next page you find a simple payoff-example:  
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Consider the following payoff-example: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
At the end of the experiment: 
At the end of the experiment there will be a small questionnaire to fill out. Furthermore, 
payoffs will be calculated - on the basis of your performance, your feedback and Person B’s 
reaction to it – a summary of all this will be displayed on your screen. Please remain seated 
until your client number (which you will find on your summary screen) is announced. Upon 
announcement please come forward so that you can be paid.   
Please raise your hand now, if you have any questions. Otherwise, please answer the questions 
on the screen and press “Next” to start stage 2 of the experiment. 
Example:  
? If you click away 20-40% of the boxes Person A receives 300 points.  
? This means, Person A has a total of 300 + 200 = 500 points including his / her initial 
endowment of 200 points.  
? If his / her feedback to you after the clicking-task is 20-40%, then you receive 150 
points from Person A’s 500 points, i.e. Person A is left with 500 - 150 = 350 points.  
? Person A’s feedback also implies that you have a total of 150 + 200 = 350 points 
including your initial endowment of 200 points. 
? If you than reduce Person A’s payoff by 40 points in reaction to his / her feedback, 
this costs you 10 points from your 350 points.  
? Given this, Person A’s final payoff (in points) is 300 + 200 – 150 – 40 = 310 points 
including the initial endowment of 200 points.  
? Your final payoff (in points) is 150 + 200 – 10 = 340 points including the initial 
endowment of 200 points. 
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Screen-shots
In this Appendix you can ﬁnd a selection of the screen-shots. The full set of screen-shots
can be obtained from the authors upon request.
[Figures A.4 - A.8]
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Appendix E
Data
[Tables A.1 and A.2 here]
Table A.1—: Descriptive Statistics A: incentive treatment
Sessions Number of Number of Number of Average Number
A-Persons B-Persons Appeared Boxes of Clicked Boxes
50 seconds: 17 17 400 101
90 seconds: 17 17 400 193.35
120 seconds: 9 9 400 202
Table A.2—: Descriptive Statistics B: incentive treatment
Sessions Average Ratio of Average Ratio of
A’s evaluation / Feedback B’s evaluation / Feedback
50 seconds: 1.48 1.85
90 seconds: 1.20 1.58
120 seconds: 1.05 1.26
Looking at Table A.1 one can see that in the incentive treatment there were 17 A- and
B-Persons in the 50 second session, 17 A- and B-Persons in the 90 second sessions and
9 A- and B-Persons in the 120 second session. In all sessions 400 boxes appeared in the
eﬀort task and the average number of boxes increased the more time B-Persons had.
Looking at Table A.2 one can see that in the incentive treatment the average ratio of
As’ evaluations to feedback is for all sessions above 1. This means, the evaluations of
A-Persons were on average better than their feedback in the incentive treatment. As
can easily be seen, the same is true for the average ratio of B-Persons’ evaluations and
feedback. Interestingly, the ratio is higher in case of B-Persons. This indicates that on
average B-Persons had a better evaluation of their own work as A-Persons.
[Tables A.3 and A.4]
Looking at Table A.3 one can see that in the ﬂat treatment there were 12 A- and B-
Persons in the 50 second session, 27 A- and B-Persons in the 90 second sessions and 13
A- and B-Persons in the 120 second session. In all sessions 400 boxes appeared in the
eﬀort task and the average number of boxes increased the more time B-Persons had. The
increase is actually a bit sharper than in the incentive treatment.
Looking at Table A.4 one can see that in the ﬂat treatment the average ratio of As’
evaluations to feedback is above 1 only for the 90 second sessions. Generally, the ratio is
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Table A.3—: Descriptive Statistics A: flat treatment
Sessions Number of Number of Number of Average Number
A-Persons B-Persons Appeared Boxes of Clicked Boxes
50 seconds: 12 12 400 87
90 seconds: 27 27 400 196
120 seconds: 13 13 400 247.5
Table A.4—: Descriptive Statistics B: flat treatment
Sessions Average Ratio of Average Ratio of
A’s evaluation / Feedback B’s evaluation / Feedback
50 seconds: 0.841 0.552
90 seconds: 1.082 1.084
120 seconds: 0.989 1.014
lower than the comparable ratio for the incentive treatment. With regard to the average
ratio of B-Persons’ evaluations and feedback, one can see that in the fast 50 second
sessions the ratio is even lower than the average ratio of As’ evaluations to feedback. In
the other two sessions it is higher, but it is generally lower compared to the incentive
treatment.
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